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Abstract: Canonical analysis of the classical general equilibrium model
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that possess fully-revealing rational expectations equilibria. This paper shows
that the analogous result is not true in urban economies. An open subset
of economies where none of the rational expectations equilibria fully reveal
private information is found. There are two important pieces. First, there
can be information about a location known by a consumer who does not live
in that location in equilibrium, and thus the equilibrium rent does not reflect
this information. Second, if a consumer’s utility depends only on information
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urally do not incorporate information about other locations conditional on
their location of residence. Existence of a rational expectations equilibrium
is proved. Space can prevent housing prices from transmitting information
from informed to uninformed households, resulting in an inefficient outcome.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
People can never fully comprehend the quality and the circumstances of a
city until they experience a significant part of their life living in that city.
Information on physical amenities of a city (i.e., weather, parks, museums,
crime, traffic jams) is easily acquired by both consumers and researchers,
so there is institutional and academic work on the quality of life in cities.1
However, people cannot completely ensure that they choose the right city
or location within the city for their family before they start experiencing
life there. For example, there could be uncertainty about the quality of
schools, congestion of commuting routes contingent on resident and business
location, or even major highway closures. Current occupants of the city, or
people with friends living in the city, might have information that others
don’t have. Moreover, even though the current environment of the city can
be understood, it is not surprising that the future developments of cities are
not known with certainty, but might be known better by current occupants.2
On the one hand, information about life in a city is reflected in the de-
mand for and thus the price of housing in the city.3 Since people are rational
in understanding and using the relationship associating a specific state of
nature with a specific equilibrium price, depending on what model people
have in mind for how equilibrium prices are determined, the price of housing
can be a signal for people in choosing a city best suited to their life style.
Recall that the concept of rational expectations equilibrium requires agents
to use models that are not obviously controverted by their observations of
the market. Therefore, the question of whether the price of housing can play
1For example, Rosen (1979), Roback (1982), and Blomquist, Berger, and Hoehn (1988)
develop a quality of life index for urban areas (QOLI), that measures or implicitly prices
the value of local amenities in urban areas.
2For example, Cronon (1991) discusses the success of Chicago in surpassing other com-
petitive cities, such as St. Louis, in the early development of the Midwest.
3It can also be reflected in wages, but for simplicity we focus on rent.
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a significant role in transmitting information from informed people to unin-
formed people not only addresses the question of the efficiency of housing
markets, but is also related to the issue of the existence of rational expecta-
tions equilibrium in urban economics.
Available information is utilized by agents in a rational expectations equi-
librium, especially the information conveyed by equilibrium prices. Radner
(1979) shows that in a particular asset trading model, if the number of states
of initial information is finite then, generically, rational expectations equilib-
ria exist where all traders’ private initial information is revealed. In contrast
to Radner’s model, that fixes state-dependent preferences and then focuses
on the information concerning traders’ conditional probabilities of various
events, Allen (1981) considers a space of economies that is defined by state-
dependent preferences and confirms Radner’s conclusion in that context.
When state space is infinite, Allen (1981) shows that the generic existence of
fully-revealing rational expectations equilibria depends on the condition that
the price space must have at least as high a dimension as the state space.
Jordan (1980) considers a model where information revealed by endogenous
variables can be affected by expectations, and then characterizes the data
that allow the generic existence of rational expectations equilibria. Jordan
concludes that unless the public prediction is based on a very narrow class of
data, a statistically correct expectation may fail to exist even for otherwise
well-behaved economies.
The existence of rational expectations equilibria where prices do not fully
reveal the state of nature motivates the development of this paper. As shown
in standard general equilibrium models in the literature, fully revealing ra-
tional expectations equilibrium demonstrates the efficiency of market prices
in information transmission. The cases where the rational expectations equi-
librium is not fully revealing are more interesting, for they admit a positive
value of private information (that cannot be learned by observing prices)
and space for discussing purchases of and strategic behavior using private
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information. In contrast with standard models, this paper focuses on the ex-
istence of non-fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium. In contrast
with Allen (1981), who proves the existence of an open and dense subset of
economies that possess fully-revealing rational expectations equilibria in the
standard general equilibrium model with a finite number of states, this paper
shows that the analogous result does not hold in urban economies. An open
subset of economies is found, where all the rational expectations equilibria
of these economies do not fully reveal private information.
Though in different settings, the common intuition behind these economies
is consistent. First of all, households’ bid rents reflect their ex ante valuations
for housing, and the expected valuations reflect households’ information (and
their prior distributions) about the states. However, the equilibrium bid rent
reveals only the winner’s valuation, instead of being determined by all house-
holds’ valuations. Therefore, in urban economics, the equilibrium price of
land reflects only the ex ante valuation and the information of the household
with the highest willingness-to-pay for a location. In contrast, the standard
general equilibrium model has aggregate excess demand that is dependent
on every household’s demand. This generates complete information revela-
tion in equilibrium generically, if there are enough prices. The difference
between the models is due to the standard assumption in urban economics
that each person can be in only one place at one time. In this circumstance,
the equilibrium price might not fully reveal households’ private information,
even if there are many prices and few states. For example, if in equilibrium a
household living in one location has information about another location, this
information might not be revealed in equilibrium rents.
The other important component, that yields an open set of economies
with not all information revealed in equilibrium, concerns perturbations of
utility functions. The set of states affecting utility of households living in
one location is assumed to be different from the set of such states in another
location; in other words, we use a product structure for the state space.
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This is what we mean when we say spatially local perturbations of utility.
Thus, when we consider perturbations of utility functions, we do not allow
the utility of households living in one location to depend even a little on
states belonging to other locations. This is what we mean when we say
perturbations are spatially local.
The model that we present covers both within-city locations and the com-
parison of different cities, though the latter case is the focus of this paper.
This paper is organized as follows: Two explicit examples give the intuition
behind the non-existence of fully-revealing rational expectations equilibrium
in Section 2. For generic results, in Section 3, we find an open subset of
economies with no fully-revealing rational expectations equilibrium, provided
that perturbations are spatially local. In Section 4, the existence of rational
expectations equilibrium is demonstrated. When some household is insensi-
tive (to be defined precisely in this section), there exists a unique non-fully
revealing rational expectations equilibrium. When all households are not
insensitive, there exists a fully-revealing rational expectations equilibrium.
When spatially non-local perturbations are considered, the results are the
same as the ones in standard general equilibrium models, namely generic
existence of fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium. In this case,
generically households are not insensitive. In Section 5, it is shown that the
introduction of financial markets into our model can restore the existence of
a fully-revealing rational expectations equilibrium, also restoring efficiency
of equilibrium allocations. Whether the introduction of financial markets is
reasonable is also examined. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Examples
Before stating formally and proving the results, let us examine a few ex-
amples. In the first example, one of the households is fully informed, whereas
the other has no information. In the second example, both households have
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partial information about the states of nature in different locations. In both
examples, the equilibrium prices are the same in different states, and hence
illustrate an economy where the rational expectations equilibria do not fully
reveal the private information of households. Examples similar to these ap-
pear in the literature on rational expectations in the standard general equi-
librium model, though in that literature they belong to the complement of a
generic set, and have a very different flavor.
2.1 The Framework
Suppose there are n households indexed by j ∈ N ≡ {1, ..., n} and n cities,
k ∈ K ≡ {1, ..., n}, each endowed with a fixed land supply of x¯k. We consider
the case where consumers obtain different utilities from living in different lo-
cations. These could represent either areas within a city or in different cities.
Beside locations, each household j has to choose the lot size of his/her house
and the consumption of composite good in city k, denoted by sjk, zjk, respec-
tively. Since it is impossible to consume a house at the same instant in two
locations, sjk > 0 implies sjk′ = 0, ∀k′ 6= k. To placate urban economists,
we shall introduce a commuting cost, but all of our arguments hold when
commuting cost is set to zero and there is only a utility difference between
locations. Consider city 1 as a core-city and others as periphery-cities. Fol-
lowing Fujita, Krugman, and Venables (2001), there is only commuting from
city k, k > 1 to city 1. Denote Tk to be the commuting cost from city k to
the core, it is assumed 0 = T1 < T2 < ... < Tn < min (Yj)j∈N to ensure that
there is no vacant city.
There are more than two states in each city, ωk ∈ Ωk, k ∈ K, repre-
senting preference differences in our model, each realized with a probability
that is common knowledge. To focus on an exchange economy, standard in
both rational expectations general equilibrium and urban economics models,
suppose that household j earns a fixed income Yj of composite good. Let
Ψk denote the rent per unit of housing in city k, k ∈ K, and normalize
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the price of freely mobile composite consumption good to be 1. Households
can augment their private information by and only by using the information
conveyed by prices.4 The rents are collected and consumed by an absentee
landlord who owns all the housing and whose utility is uL((sLk)k∈K, zL) = zL
in all states. The landlord is endowed with an inelastic supply of housing in
all cities.
Each household can consume housing in only one city. Denote household
j’s consumption in city k in state ω as ϕjk ≡ (sjk, zjk) and let ϕj ≡ (ϕjk)k∈K
denote j’s consumption in all cities. In state ω, given ϕj, the ex post utility
function of household j is
uωj (ϕj) = max{(uωjk(ϕjk))k∈K},
ω ∈ Ω. Let Ψk be the rent of housing in city k, let ψk ≡ (Ψk, 1) be the prices
of housing and composite good in city k where composite good is numeraire,
and let Ψ ≡ (ψk)k∈K denote the prices in all cities. The general optimization
problem for household j with n cities, given his/her information structure
Fj, is:5
max
ϕωj
Euj(ϕωj |Fj)
s.t.
∑
k∈K
ψkϕωjk +
∑
k∈K
p
sωjk∑
k′∈K sωjk′
q Tk ≤ Yj,
ϕωjk 6= 0 implies that ϕωjk′ = 0, ∀k, k′ ∈ K, k′ 6= k
ϕωj ∈ R2n+ is Fj-measurable. (1)
Given a price Ψ, the information that it conveys to all agents is denoted by
σ(Ψ), the sub-σ-field of F generated by the vector-valued random variable Ψ.
Let µ denote a (countably) additive probability measure defined on (Ω,F).
4When households condition their expectations on additional market variables, the
equilibrium concept is defined as a generalized rational expectations equilibrium; see Allen
(1998).
5The ceiling function, denoted by pθq, is defined by the smallest integer greater than
or equal to θ, i.e., pθq ≡ min{n ∈ Z|θ ≤ n}. Notice that p sjk∑
k′∈K sωjk′
q can be either 1 or
0, depending on whether household j lives in city k or not.
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Following Allen (1981), the concept of rational expectations equilibrium is
formally defined as follows.
Definition 1 A rational expectations equilibrium is defined as an equivalence
class of F-measurable house price functions Ψ∗ : Ω → R2n+ , and for each
j ∈ N , an equivalence class of Fj ∨ σ(Ψ∗)-measurable allocation functions
ϕ∗j : Ω→
⋃
k∈K R2+ such that
(i) ψω∗k · ϕω∗jk ≤ Yj − Tk for µ-almost every ω ∈ Ω;
(ii) If ϕ′jk : Ω → R2+ satisfies the informational constraint that ϕ′jk is Fj ∨
σ(Ψ∗)-measurable and the budget constraint that ψω∗k · ϕω′jk ≤ Yj − Tk for
µ-almost every ω ∈ Ω, then
∑
ω∈Ω
uωj (ϕ′j) µ(ω|Fj ∨ σ(Ψ∗)) ≤
∑
ω∈Ω
uωj (ϕ∗j) µ(ω|Fj ∨ σ(Ψ∗)), ∀j = 1, 2;
(iii)
∑
j∈N sω∗jk = s¯k,
∑
k∈K
∑
j∈N zω∗jk + zω∗L +
∑
k∈K
∑
j∈Np
sωjk∑
k′∈K sωjk′
q Tk =∑
j∈N Yj, and for each j, ϕωjk 6= 0 implies that ϕωjk′ = 0, ∀k′ 6= k for µ-almost
every ω ∈ Ω.
It can be seen that
∑
ω∈Ω uωj (ϕj) µ(ω|Fj∨σ(Ψ∗)) is household j’s expected
utility of choosing ϕj, based on private information and the information given
by Ψ∗.
This is the minimal perturbation of the standard general equilibrium
model necessary to make it compatible with urban economics, i.e., it is the
standard general equilibrium model that restricts each consumer to own hous-
ing in one and only one location. In what follows, we will solve for a bid rent
equilibrium, that is equivalent to the solution of a standard market equi-
librium. This device is common in urban economics, and is used “almost
everywhere.”
Definition 2 Denoting Ψωjk ≡ maxϕωjk{
Yj−Tk−zωjk
sωjk
|E[uj|Fj∨σ(Ψ∗)] = u¯j}, for
µ-a.e. ω ∈ Ω, a bid rent equilibrium is defined by (Ψω∗, (ϕω∗j )j∈N) such that
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for µ-almost every ω ∈ Ω, for each city k ∈ K:
Ψω∗k (u) = maxj {Ψ
ω
jk(u)}; (2)
ϕω∗jk =



argmaxϕωjk{
Yj−Tk−zωjk
sωjk
|E[uj|Fj ∨ σ(Ψ∗)] = u}, if j ∈ argmaxj{Ψωjk},
(0, 0), if j /∈ argmaxj{Ψωjk};
(3)
∑
j∈N
sω∗jk = s¯k,
∑
k∈K
∑
j∈N
zω∗jk + zω∗L +
∑
k∈K
∑
j∈N
p
sωjk∑
k′∈K sωjk′
q Tk =
∑
j∈N
Yj,
and ϕωjk 6= 0 implies that ϕωjk′ = 0, ∀k′ 6= k, ∀j ∈ N. (4)
Since each household can consume housing in at most one city, the con-
sumption set is
⋃
k∈K R2+, and the ex post state-dependent preferences of
living in city k, k ∈ K, can be specified by utilities ujk : Ωk → κjk, where
κjk is a compact subset of Cr(R2+,R), r ≥ 2, endowed with the weak Cr
compact-open topology. Assume that for every ωk, uωkjk ∈ κjk satisfies for
each ϕjk ∈ R2+:
(i) strict (differentiable) monotonicity: Dϕuωkjk (ϕ) ∈ R++,
(ii) strict (differentiable) concavity: Dϕϕuωkjk (ϕ) is negative definite, and
(iii) smooth boundary condition: the closure in R2 of the upper contour set
{ϕ′ ∈ R2++|u
ωk
jk (ϕ′) ≥ u
ωk
jk (ϕ)} is contained in R2++.
These conditions ensure that every household’s state-dependent preferences
are smooth in the sense of Debreu (1972) for almost every state so that,
conditional on any measurable ω ∈ F and location, demands are well defined
Cr−1 functions. Our examples satisfy these assumptions.
Although it is well-known that bid-rent and competitive equilibria are
closely connected (see for example Fujita, 1989), results in the literature cover
only the context of no uncertainty. If the rational expectations equilibria were
known to be fully revealing, this result could be applied state by state. We
require an equivalence result in the context of uncertainty, especially when
the rational expectations equilibrium might not be fully revealing. The proof
uses classical duality.
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Lemma 1 Given that all households’ preferences are representable by a util-
ity function satisfying conditions (i), (ii), and (iii), (Ψω∗, (ϕω∗j )j∈N) consti-
tutes a bid rent equilibrium if and only if it constitutes a rational expectations
equilibrium in a competitive economy.
Proof. See Appendix A.
2.2 Example 1
Suppose that there are two households (j ∈ {1, 2}) with the same income
(Y1 = Y2 = Y ), and two cities (k ∈ {x, y}) with land endowments x¯ and y¯,
respectively. Household 1’s utility is state-dependent but the utility function
of household 2 is independent of states. In each city k, there are two states
ωk ∈ Ωk ≡ {L,H}, k ∈ {x, y}, which are equally likely to occur and the
states in different cities are not correlated. What each agent can observe are
events that are subsets of Ω ≡ Ωx × Ωy. Denote ω ≡ ωx × ωy as an element
of Ω. Furthermore, household 1 has no information, and household 2 knows
what the state will be. That is, households’ information are represented by
F1 = {φ,Ωx} × {φ,Ωy}, F2 = {φ, {H}, {L},Ωx} × {φ, {H}, {L},Ωy} which
are sub-σ-fields of F , where F ≡ F1∨F2 is the smallest σ-field generated by
the class F1
⋃
F2 of subsets of Ω = {HH,HL, LH,LL}.6 Everything except
the true state is common knowledge, so households are assumed to know the
relationship between states and prices.
Given information structure F1, the superscripts on household 1’s alloca-
tion can be ignored for simplicity until he/she learns something. The opti-
mization problem for household 1 is to maximize expected utility subject to
6Following Aumann (1976), the join F1 ∨ F2 denotes the coarsest common refinement
of F1 and F2.
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the budget constraint:
max
s1x,s1y ,z1x,z1y
Eu1(s1x, s1y, z1x, z1y|F1)
= max{E[αω1 ln(s1x) + ln(z1x)|F1], E[βω1 ln(s1y) + ln(z1y)|F1]}
s.t. Ψxs1x +Ψys1y + z1x + z1y + p
s1y
s1x + s1y
q t ≤ Y,
s1k s1l = 0, s1k z1l = 0, z1k z1l = 0,
s1k, z1k ≥ 0, ∀k, l = x, y, k 6= l;
In contrast, since household 2’s utility is state-independent, his/her opti-
mization problem is for all ω ∈ Ω
max
sω2x,sω2y,zω2x,zω2y
uω2 (sω2x, sω2y, zω2x, zω2y)
= max{α2 ln(sω2x) + ln(zω2x), β2 ln(sω2y) + ln(zω2y)}
s.t. Ψxsω2x +Ψysω2y + zω2x + zω2y + p
sω2y
sω2x + sω2y
q t ≤ Y,
sω2k sω2l = 0, sω2k zω2l = 0, zω2k zω2l = 0,
sω2k, zω2k ≥ 0, ∀k, l = x, y, k 6= l.
Suppose that household 1 prefers city x more than household 2, and house-
hold 2 prefers y more than household 1, i.e., E[αω1 ] > α2 and E[βω1 ] < β2.
In urban economics, as studied by Alonso (1964), bid rent describes a
particular household’s willingness to pay for housing in terms of compos-
ite commodity, given a fixed utility level. Following Fujita (1989) and our
Lemma 1, people live where their bid rents are maximal in equilibrium, and
these bid rents are equilibrium rents. The bid rent functions of the two
households for the housing in x and y are
Ψω1x = maxs1x
Y − eEu1(s1x)−E[α
ω
1 ]
s1x
, (5)
Ψω1y = maxs1y
Y − t− eEu1(s1y)−E[β
ω
1 ]
s1y
, (6)
Ψω2x = maxsω2x
Y − euω2 (sω2x)−α2
sω2x
, (7)
Ψω2y = maxsω2y
Y − t− euω2 (sω2y)−β2
sω2y
, (8)
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where ω ∈ Ω. From first and second-order conditions, the optimal land lot
sizes for households are
sω∗1x = [
eEu1(1 + E[αω1 ])
Y
]
1
E[αω1 ] , (9)
sω∗1y = [
eEu1(1 + E[βω1 ])
Y − t ]
1
E[βω1 ] , (10)
sω∗2x = [
euω2 (1 + α2)
Y ]
1
α2 , (11)
sω∗2y = [
euω2 (1 + β2)
Y − t ]
1
β2 . (12)
From market clearing conditions sω∗jx = x¯ and sω∗jy = y¯, we have
Eu∗1 =
{
ln[Y ] + E[αω1 ] ln[x¯]− ln[1 + E[αω1 ]], if household 1 lives at x;
ln[Y − t] + E[βω1 ] ln[y¯]− ln[1 + E[βω1 ]], if household 1 lives at y,
(13)
uω∗2 =
{
ln[Y ] + α2 ln[x¯]− ln[1 + α2], if household 2 lives at x;
ln[Y − t] + β2 ln[y¯]− ln[1 + β2], if household 2 lives at y,
(14)
for ω ∈ Ω. So the equilibrium bid rents of agents in the two cities in two
states are
Ψω∗1x =
E[αω1 ]
1 + E[αω1 ]
Y
x¯ , (15)
Ψω∗1y =
E[βω1 ]
1 + E[βω1 ]
Y − t
y¯
, (16)
Ψω∗2x =
α2
1 + α2
Y
x¯
, (17)
Ψω∗2y =
β2
1 + β2
Y − t
y¯
, (18)
for ω ∈ Ω. The equilibrium bid rents are presented in Figure 1, where the
horizontal axis represents the amount of transportation cost and the vertical
axis represents the individuals’ bid rents.
Since E[α
ω
1 ]
1+E[αω1 ]
> α21+α2 if and only if E[α
ω
1 ] > α2, given E[αω1 ] > α2, the
bid rent of household 1 for the housing in x is higher than that of household
11
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Figure 1: The bid rent functions in Example 1, where the dotted lines
represent ΨHL∗1 and ΨLH∗1 , respectively.
2 for the housing in x in both states. Similarly, since E[β
ω
1 ]
1+E[βω1 ]
< β21+β2 if and
only if E[βω1 ] < β2, E[βω1 ] < β2 implies that the bid rent of household 1
for the housing in y is lower than that of household 2 for the housing in y
in all states. Therefore, the equilibrium location pattern where household 1
lives at x and household 2 lives in y is verified under the conditions we have
assumed.
Notice that there is no equilibrium that fully reveals information. If in
equilibrium ΨHH∗x = ΨHL∗x 6= ΨLH∗x = ΨLL∗x , the valuation of household 1
for the housing in city x differs in different states (in city x), which conflicts
with the assumption that household 1 has no information about the state.
Notice also that Ψω∗x and Ψω∗y depend only on the mean of α1, β2, and the
values of Y , t, x¯, and y¯. Therefore, the equilibrium rents in the two cities are
independent of the realized state, and there exists no fully-revealing rational
12
expectations equilibrium.7 Even though household 2 knows the state, since
household 2 doesn’t care about the state, equilibrium prices don’t reveal it.
2.3 Example 2
Follow the same setting in the previous example, but suppose that household
1 knows the state in city y, but has no information about city x. On the
other hand, household 2 knows only the state in city x, but not the state in y.
Furthermore, the states in the two cities are not correlated. That is, let Ω ≡
Ωx × Ωy, where Ωx = Ωy ≡ {H,L} represent the state spaces in cities x and
y. F1 = {φ,Ωx}×{φ,Ωy, {H}, {L}}, F2 = {φ,Ωx, {H}, {L}}× {φ,Ωy} ⊆ F
are sub-σ-fields representing private information. Again, the relationship
between states and prices is common knowledge.
Each household chooses to live in one and only one city. Moreover, house-
holds make their decisions simultaneously. Given an event ω ∈ Ω, both
households’ utilities are state-dependent, so their optimization problems are
max
s1x,sω1y,z1x,zω1y
Eu1(s1x, sω1y, z1x, zω1y|F1)
= max{E[αω1 ln(s1x) + ln(z1x)|F1], βω1 ln(sω1y) + ln(zω1y)}
s.t. Ψxs1x +Ψysω1y + z1x + zω1y + p
sω1y
sω1x + sω1y
q t ≤ Y,
s1x sω1y = 0, s1x zω1y = 0, z1x sω1y = 0, z1x zω1y = 0,
s1x, sω1y, z1x, zω1y ≥ 0;
max
sω2x,s2y,zω2x,z2y
Eu2(sω2x, s2y, zω2x, z2y|F2)
= max{αω2 ln(sω2x) + ln(zω2x), E[βω2 ln(s2y) + ln(z2y)|F2]}
s.t. Ψxsω2x +Ψys2y + zω2x + z2y + p
sω2y
sω2x + sω2y
q t ≤ Y,
sω2x s2y = 0, sω2x z2y = 0, zω2x s2y = 0, zω2x z2y = 0,
sω2x, s2y, zω2x, z2y ≥ 0;
7There is another way to prove the same result. Since household 1’s bid rent in x and
household 2’s bid rent in y are independent of the state, it must be true that Fj∨σ(Ψω∗) =
{φ,Ω}, ∀j = 1, 2. If the equilibrium price is fully revealing, then σ(Ψω∗) is finer than
Fj ∨ σ(Ψω∗), a contradiction.
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Note that in fact, the optimized utility of household 1 is state-dependent
(state-independent) at y (x), denoted by uω∗1y (Eu∗1x); uω∗2x and Eu∗2y are
similarly defined. To present an example of rational expectations equilib-
rium without revealing private information, suppose that E[αω1 ] > αω2 and
E[βω2 ] > βω1 , for all ω ∈ Ω.
Given these conditions, suppose that households 1 and 2 choose to live in
cities x and y, respectively. Their bid rent functions are, ∀ω ∈ Ω,
Ψω1x = maxs1x
Y − eEu1s−E[α
ω
1 ]
1x
s1x
, (19)
Ψω1y = maxs1y
Y − t− euω1 s−β
ω
1
1y
s1y
, (20)
Ψω2x = maxs2x
Y − euω2 s−α
ω
2
2x
s2x
, (21)
Ψω2y = maxs2y
Y − t− eEu2s−E[β
ω
2 ]
2y
s2y
. (22)
Thus, the optimal land sizes for household 1 and 2 are, ∀ω ∈ Ω,
sω∗1x = [
eEu1(1 + E[αω1 ])
Y
]
1
E[αω1 ] , (23)
sω∗1y = [
euω1 (1 + βω1 )
Y − t
]
1
βω1 , (24)
sω∗2x = [
euω2 (1 + αω2 )
Y ]
1
αω2 , (25)
sω∗2y = [
eEu2(1 + E[βω2 ])
Y − t ]
1
E[βω2 ] . (26)
From sω∗jx = x¯ and sω∗jy = y¯, we have
Eu∗1(·|F1) =
{
ln[Y ] + E[αω1 ] ln[x¯]− ln[1 + E[αω1 ]], if household 1 lives at x;
ln[Y − t] + βω1 ln[y¯]− ln[1 + βω1 ], if household 1 lives at y,
(27)
Eu∗2(·|F2) =
{
ln[Y ] + αω2 ln[x¯]− ln[1 + αω2 ], if household 2 lives at x;
ln[Y − t] + E[βω2 ] ln[y¯]− ln[1 + E[βω2 ]], if household 2 lives at y.
(28)
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Again, agents’ equilibrium bid rents are
Ψω∗1x =
E[αω1 ]
1 + E[αω1 ]
Y
x¯
, (29)
Ψω∗1y =
βω1
1 + βω1
Y − t
y¯ , (30)
Ψω∗2x =
αω2
1 + αω2
Y
x¯
, (31)
Ψω∗2y =
E[βω2 ]
1 + E[βω2 ]
Y − t
y¯
, (32)
where ω ∈ Ω. The equilibrium bid rents are drawn in Figure 2, where the
horizontal axis represents the transportation cost and the individual bid rents
are represented by the vertical axis.
-
ΨHH∗1
ΨLL∗1
ΨHH∗2
ΨLL∗2
x
CBD
y
t
Ψ
Figure 2: The bid rent functions in Example 2, where the dotted lines
represent ΨHL∗1 , ΨLH∗1 , ΨHL∗2 , and ΨLH∗2 , respectively.
Inequalities E[αω1 ] > αω2 and E[βω2 ] > βω1 , ∀ω, imply that the bid rent
of household 1 (household 2) for the housing in x (y) is always higher than
that of household 2 (household 1). So the equilibrium location pattern where
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household 1 lives at x and household 2 lives at y is verified.8
Again, there is no fully revealing equilibrium in this example. Since Ψ∗x
and Ψ∗y depend only on Y , t, the mean of the preference parameters and
the endowments of land in cities, the equilibrium rents are the same in all
the realized states. That is, the mapping from prices to preferences is not
injective, which is the source of the non-existence of fully-revealing rational
expectations equilibrium.
These examples illustrate different causes for the equilibrium not fully
revealing private information: The first one comes from the fact that the
informed household doesn’t care about different states. The second one comes
from the mismatch between informed households and their locations. In the
next section, we show that these unfortunate circumstances can persist under
arbitrarily small perturbations.
3 An Open Subset of Economies without Fully
Revealing Equilibria
The examples represent two points in the space of utility functions with no
fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium. In this section, we gen-
eralize the examples and show that, in economies under uncertainty where
there is no market for contingent claims or financial contracts, fully reveal-
ing rational expectations equilibrium is not present for an open set of utility
functions. But for all parameters satisfying a condition, there exists a ratio-
nal expectations equilibrium that might not be fully revealing. This will be
proved in the next section.
Suppose there are two households (j ∈ N ≡ {1, 2}), one landlord (j = L),
and two cities (k ∈ K ≡ {x, y}). Let Ω ≡ Ωx × Ωy = {H,L} × {H,L}
8Even when households can observe other households’ consumption (of housing and
composite good), given that the states in two cities are not correlated, the non-existence
of fully-revealing generalized rational expectations equilibria (GREE) still holds in this
example.
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be the finite payoff-relevant state space of the economy; every element ω ≡
ωx×ωy ∈ Ω is called a state of the economy. Every household is endowed with
the same initial state-independent endowment Y, a private information sub-
σ-field Fj j F , and a state-dependent utility function uj ≡ max{ujx, ujy}
defined on Ω × (R2+ ∪ R2+), meaning that households must each choose a
location. Households are assumed to maximize their conditional expected
utilities, where the ex post state-dependent preferences of living in city k
are specified by ujk : Ωk → κjk, where κjk is a compact subset of Cr(R2+,R)
functions, r ≥ 2, which is endowed with the weak Cr compact-open topology.
For each state ω, the economy (Y, uωj (·)j∈N) is a smooth economy as defined
by Debreu (1972). It is important to notice that ujk is payoff-relevant to only
Ωk, that is, we assume that people living in city k care only about the state
in k. Later, we consider the perturbations that maintain this property.
Before we prove the results, some characteristics of equilibrium must be
defined. In a rational expectations equilibrium, the information can be fully
revealing, which means that all households can learn the state of nature by
observing the equilibrium price and using their private information. Alterna-
tively, the information can be non-fully revealing in a rational expectations
equilibrium, where at least one household cannot tell the state of nature from
the equilibrium price and their private information. Their formal definitions
are as follows.
Definition 3 A fully-revealing rational expectations equilibrium is a rational
expectations equilibrium such that
Fj ∨ σ(Ψ∗) = F , ∀j ∈ N. (33)
When there is at least one j such that the above equality does not hold, we
say it is a non-fully-revealing rational expectations equilibrium.
In other words, conditioning on a fully revealing equilibrium price func-
tion is equivalent to knowing the pooled information of all households in the
economy. Though Allen (1981) proves the existence of an open and dense
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subset of economies with fully-revealing rational expectations equilibrium in
the classical framework, when perturbations location-by-location are consid-
ered, Theorem 1 will show that the same statement does not hold in urban
economics. Utility functions defined location-by-location are termed formally
as local utilities as follows.9 We have been using them in this paper up to
this point.
Definition 4 (Local Utilities)
The households’ preferences are called local when their preferences satisfy
∀j ∈ N, k ∈ K, ujk : Ωk → κjk. If for some j, k, there exists k′, k′ 6= k such
that ujk : Ωk × Ωk′ → κjk is not constant for some ωk′, ω′k′ ∈ Ωk′ , then it is
called non-local.
That is, saying that utilities are local requires that each household’s utility
in k is measurable with respect to only Ωk when they live in city k. We shall
require that when utility functions are perturbed, if they start local, they
remain local. We call this a “spatially local perturbation.” Spatially local
perturbation means that if people living in a city care only about the state
in the city where they live, then when their utility function is perturbed,
it continues to have this property. Spatially local perturbations are more
realistic than non-local perturbations in urban economics, since it is not
persuasive to say that the perturbed preferences conditional on residence in
city k depend on the state in another city. For example, when preference
perturbations are considered, in most cases, the state of living in Chicago is
irrelevant to the circumstances in New York. Therefore, in urban economics,
it doesn’t make sense to consider spatially non-local perturbations as used
in standard models. Throughout this paper, to highlight the distinct essence
of urban economics, we focus on spatially local perturbations.
It is possible to add other kinds of perturbations to the model, for exam-
ple, national or regional uncertainty, but this would only complicate notation.
9Throughout this paper, only preference perturbations are considered since endowment
perturbations give households more information, and perturbations of ex ante information
are not smooth.
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Theorem 1 Given the discrete state space Ω, consider local perturbations
of households’ preferences. There exists an open subset of economies that
possess no fully-revealing rational expectations equilibrium.
Proof. Consider example 1 first. Notice that in equilibrium, household 1’s
marginal rate of substitution for housing in city x is E[α
ω
1 ]
1+E[αω1 ]
Y
x¯ . On the other
hand, household 2’s marginal rate of substitution for housing in x is α
ω
2
1+αω2
Y
x¯ .
Let αHH1 = αHL1 > αLH1 = αLL1 and βHH1 = βLH1 > βHL1 = βLL1 .
Since in the example E[αω1 ] > α2 and E[βω1 ] < β2, we can choose α =
E[αω1 ]−α2
(E[αω1 ]+α2)Y+(2+E[αω1 ]+α2)x¯
> 0, β = β2−E[β
ω
1 ]
(E[βω1 ]+β2)Y+(2+E[βω1 ]+β2)y¯
> 0, and  =
min{α, β}. Recall that the equilibrium marginal utilities in example 1 are
v∗ ≡ (Ds1xEu∗1, Ds1yEu∗1, Dz1xEu∗1, Dz1yEu∗1, Ds2xuω∗2 , Ds2yuω∗2 , Dz2xuω∗2 , Dz2yuω∗2 ).
Centered at v∗, consider all spatially local perturbations of utility functions
within an open set in the weak Cr topology such that
Ds1kEu1 ∈ (Ds1kEu∗1 − ,Ds1kEu∗1 + ), (34)
Dz1kEu1 ∈ (Dz1kEu∗1 − ,Dz1kEu∗1 + ), (35)
Ds2kuω2 ∈ (Ds2kuω∗2 − ,Ds2kuω∗2 + ), (36)
Dz2kuω2 ∈ (Dz2kuω∗2 − ,Dz2kuω∗2 + ), k = x, y. (37)
These perturbations are evaluated at city k, k = x, y, individually, and are
thus spatially local perturbations. Then it can be checked that all utilities
within this neighborhood generate bid rents that are within  of the equilib-
rium bid rents in example 1. Furthermore, household 1’s realized marginal
rate of substitution for housing in city x is always higher than the marginal
rate of substitution of household 2; household 2’s marginal rate of substitu-
tion for housing in city y is always higher than that of household 1.10
10In city x, for example, since the lowest MRS for household 1 is E[α
ω
1 ]/x¯−
(1+E[αω1 ])/Y+
,
and the highest MRS for household 2 is α2/x¯+(1+α2)/Y− , household 1’s MRS is greater
than household 2’s MRS if and only if  < α = E[α
ω
1 ]−α2
(E[αω1 ]+α2)Y+(2+E[αω1 ]+α2)x¯
. Simi-
larly, household 2’s MRS in city y is greater than that of household 1 if and only if
 < β = β2−E[β
ω
1 ]
(E[βω1 ]+β2)Y+(2+E[βω1 ]+β2)y¯
.
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Now we can prove the non-existence of fully revealing rational expecta-
tions equilibrium for all economies in this neighborhood. Suppose for any
set of preferences within these spatially local perturbations, there exists a
fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium (ϕ∗1, ϕ∗2,Ψ∗). Then the un-
informed household (household 1) can infer the state of nature by observing
Ψ∗. However, within the perturbations, the equilibrium bid rents are the
same across states, contradicting that Ψ∗ is a fully-revealing rational expec-
tations equilibrium price.
Obviously, a similar argument works for the cases with more than 2 states
and example 2. Q.E.D.
This paper shows that if one household has the information about a spe-
cific city, if he doesn’t live there, the housing price in that city will not reveal
his information. If a household lives in the city about which he is informed,
there is an information gain (in that he can maximize ex post utility instead
of expected utility), but also a information spillover to all other households
in that they can learn private information about that city by observing the
equilibrium housing price. When local utility and spatially local perturba-
tions are considered, the information spillover plays no role for the households
living in other cities. However, when spatially non-local perturbations are
considered, a small perturbation makes the utility in city k relevant to the
states of all cities. Then as shown in Allen (1981), generically there ex-
ists an open and dense set of economies possessing fully revealing rational
expectations equilibrium.
Finally, we make a remark here: If there is no fully revealing rational
expectations equilibrium, an equilibrium allocation can fail to be a Pareto
optimum. Consider a variation of Example 1 shown in Figure 3. When the
probability is quite evenly distributed over states in Ωk, k = 1, 2, household
1’s bid rent for city 1 is larger than that of household 2, and household 2’s
bid rent for city 2 is larger than that of household 1. So in equilibrium,
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household j lives in city j, j = 1, 2 in both states. However, in a Pareto
optimum, household j lives in city 3− j, j = 1, 2 when ω = LH. Therefore,
we have an example with an equilibrium allocation that is ex ante but not
ex post efficient.
-
ΨHH∗1
ΨLL∗1
ΨHL∗1
ΨLH∗1
Ψω∗2
1
CBD
2
t
Ψ
Figure 3: The non-fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium alloca-
tion can fail to be Pareto optimal.
4 The Existence of Rational Expectations Equi-
librium
After presenting an open subset of economies that possess non-fully-revealing
rational expectations equilibrium, it is natural to ask: Can a rational expec-
tations equilibrium fail to exist in urban economies? This can undermine
the minimal requirement for further analysis in urban economics with un-
certainty. In this section, the existence of (not necessarily fully-revealing)
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rational expectations equilibrium is examined, given the assumption of or-
dered relative steepness of bid-rents. First we describe how the existence of
equilibrium depends on the number of locations relative to the number of
households.11
When the number of locations is greater than the number of households,
since each household can consume housing in at most one city, there must
exist at least one city where no household lives. In these abandoned cities, by
Walras’ Law, the price of housing is zero. Therefore, unless the commuting
cost is very high and these cities are far away from the core cities, households
have an incentive to move into these cities to enjoy a higher utility. In this
case, there is no equilibrium.
When the number of locations is the same as the number of households,
the assumption of ordered relative steepness of bid rents ensures that every
location is occupied by exactly one household in equilibrium. Therefore, we
can settle households one-by-one from the core to periphery in the order of
the slopes of their bid rents, constituting an equilibrium allocation.12 Thus,
we know ex ante what information will be revealed by equilibrium prices, so
we can add this information to the consumer’s optimization problem. The
case when the number of households is larger than the number of locations
is left to future work. This case is difficult because we don’t know ex ante
(due to an endogenous lot size) where consumers will reside in equilibrium,
so we don’t know what information will be revealed by equilibrium prices.
This would be the case, for example, if there were a continuum of consumers.
Suppose there are n households and n locations. Before proving a theorem
on the existence of equilibrium, we need to make following assumptions on
households’ bid rents. These assumptions are standard in urban economics;
11By contrast, in standard general equilibrium models, the focus is on the dimension of
prices (which is the same as the number of cities in our examples) relative to the dimension
of parameters.
12Without the assumption of ordered relative steepness of bid rents, we must find a fixed
point in the information structure, which is hard.
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see for example Fujita (1985, 1989).13 Given a distance t from the core, a
specific state ω, and a utility level u, denote Ψωj (t, u) ≡ maxϕωjk{
Yj−t−zωj
sωj
|uj =
u} to be household j’s bid rent for the housing in the distance t, given ω and
u.14
Assumption 1 (Ordered Relative Steepness of Bid Rent)
Households’ bid rent functions are ordered by their relative steepnesses. That
is, given j < j ′ ≤ n, Ψωj is steeper than Ψωj′: Whenever Ψωj (t¯, uj) = Ψωj′(t¯, uj′) >
0 for some t¯, uj and uj′, then
Ψωj (t, uj) > Ψωj′(t, uj′) ∀ 0 ≤ t < t¯, (38)
Ψωj (t, uj) < Ψωj′(t, uj′) ∀ t > t¯ where Ψωj (t, uj) > 0. (39)
When households have the same utility function but different incomes,
and when housing is a normal good, ordered relative steepness of bid rents
is naturally satisfied.15 However, when households have different utilities
but the same income, ordered relative steepness of bid rent is not implied.
The assumption of ordered relative steepness of bid rents ensures that given
arbitrary levels of utilities for two agents, for each state, their bid rents must
single cross at one point as shown in Figure 4, where the bid rent curves shift
down as the utility levels increase. For example, the Cobb-Douglas utilities
in Example 1 and 2 satisfy the assumption of ordered relative steepness of bid
rents, and so do quasi-linear utilities. In what follows, we prove the existence
of rational expectations equilibrium given the assumption of ordered relative
steepness of bid rents.
13In fact, in standard urban economics, the assumption of ordered relative steepness
relates to only the uniqueness of equilibrium and makes the proof easier, but existence of
equilibrium in urban economics can be proved without this assumption when there is no
uncertainty; see Fujita and Smith (1987).
14Notice that though cities are discrete points on the line representing distance to the
CBD, households’ bid rents are in fact continuous functions of the distance from core.
15See Fujita (1989), page 28-29.
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-Ψω1 (t, u)
Ψω2 (t, u)
CBD
t
Ψ
Figure 4: Example where households’ bid rents satisfy ordered relative
steepness of bid rents.
4.1 When households are insensitive
There are n households indexed by j ∈ N ≡ {1, ..., n}, and n cities, k ∈
K ≡ {1, ..., n}. Cities are indexed by the order of increasing distance from
the core. That is, let Tk denote the commuting cost from city k to the core,
0 = T1 < T2 < ... < Tn < min (Yj)j∈N is assumed to ensure that there is
no vacant city. Let s¯k be the land supply in city k. Also let σ˜k ≡ σ(Ωk) ×
(×k′ 6=k{φ,Ωk′}), which is the σ-algebra indicating that only the state in city
k is known, whereas all states in other cities are completely unknown. To
begin, given ordered steepness of bid rents and the same number of consumers
and locations, use Assumption 1 to order consumers so that consumer 1 has
the steepest bid rent, consumer 2 the next steepest, and so forth. Since
the examples in Section 2 highlight the condition required for the existence
of non-fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium, in what follows we
focus on the case where households present insensitivity:
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Definition 5 (Insensitivity)
There exist states (ω, ω′) ∈ Ω × Ω such that for each household j such that
ω and ω′ are in different partition elements of Fj,
Dsωjju
ω
jj
Dzωjju
ω
jj
∣∣∣
ϕω∗jj
=
Dsω′jj u
ω′
jj
Dzω′jj u
ω′
jj
∣∣∣
ϕω′∗jj
, (40)
but there exists j ′ for whom ω and ω′ are in the same element (with a positive
probability) of Fj′, uω∗j′j′ 6= uω
′∗
j′j′.
Let u∗∗ solve Ψω∗k (u) =
DsωkkEukk
DzωkkEukk
∣∣∣
ϕω∗kk (u)
; given housing is a normal good,
Berliant and Fujita (1992) show that this solution is unique. So equilibrium
always exists and is unique in our model, and the question then becomes
whether it is fully revealing or not. Insensitivity is a necessary and suffi-
cient condition for existence of a non-fully revealing rational expectations
equilibrium.
The intuition for the condition of insensitivity is that for any household
who has information, his/her marginal rate of substitution in city k is in-
dependent of two realized states. However, to ensure that the household’s
information is not trivial, we need the second part of the assumption which
implies that his/her information about city k does matter for some other
household. Insensitivity can result from one or more of several sources: util-
ity could be quasi-linear, or information about conditions at another location
can be irrelevant to a consumer, or some information is irrelevant to all con-
sumers.
Now, consider a public partitional information function P that for every
ω ∈ Ω, a nonempty subset P (ω) of Ω is assigned, where (1) for every ω ∈ Ω,
ω ∈ P (ω); (2) ω′ ∈ P (ω) implies P (ω′) = P (ω). Moreover, for every (ω, ω′)
satisfying insensitivity, P (ω′) = P (ω). This condition implies that when ω
and ω′ are insensitive, and ω′ and ω′′ are insensitive, then P (ω) = P (ω′) =
P (ω′′). So it can be checked that
P (ω) = {ω′
∣∣P (ω′) = P (ω)} (41)
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In other words, P (ω) is a partition element collecting states that are di-
rectly or transitively insensitive with ω. Intuitively, for all states in P (ω),
either households have no information to distinguish them, or the informed
households cannot reflect their information by differences in their marginal
rate of substitution. The non-fully revealing rational expectations equilib-
rium is supported by the σ-algebra generated by the above public partitional
information functions.
Theorem 2 Given Assumption 1 and that housing consumption is a normal
good, under insensitivity, for j = 1, ..., n, there is an equivalence class of
σ(P (ω))ω∈Ω-measurable bid rent functions Ψ∗j : Ω → R+ and Fj ∨ σ(Ψ∗j)-
measurable consumption functions ϕ∗j : Ω → R2+ ∪ R2+ that constitute a
unique non-fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium such that, for k ∈
{1, ..., n},
Ψω∗k (u) = Ψωkk(u) = maxsωkk,zωkk
{Yk − Tk − z
ω
kk
sωkk
|E[ukk|Fk ∨ σ(Ψω∗k )] = u}; (42)
ϕω∗jk (u) =



(s¯k, Yk − Tk −Ψω∗k (u) s¯k), if j = k,
(0, 0), if j 6= k;
(43)
and the equilibrium utility level u∗∗ can be solved by
Ψω∗k (u∗∗) =
DsωkkE[ukk|Fk ∨ σ(Ψ
ω∗
k )]
DzωkkE[ukk|Fk ∨ σ(Ψ
ω∗
k )]
∣∣∣
ϕω∗kk (u∗∗)
. (44)
Proof. First, by Lemma 1, the rational expectations equilibrium corresponds
to the bid rent equilibrium. Second, given Assumption 1, every city is occu-
pied by exactly one household; otherwise, there exists an empty city with zero
housing price (by Walras’ Law) where all households will move. Since house-
hold 1 has the steepest bid rent, from equation (2) in Definition 2, he/she
must occupy the housing in city 1 in equilibrium. After settling household 1,
we can consider the problem as the one with n−1 households (j ∈ {2, ..., n})
and n − 1 cities (k ∈ {2, ..., n}). Then, household 2 has a steeper bid rents
than remaining households, so he/she wins the housing in city 2. Following
the same logic, in equilibrium all households are arranged that household j
26
lives in city j, or say, city k is occupied by household k, and no one has an
incentive to move. This is a standard argument in urban economics.
As shown in Figure 5, given that household k is located in city k, the
intercept of budget line Yk−Tk and the housing supply s¯k are determined by
parameters. Now, given arbitrary u, the slope of budget line Ψω∗k (u) and the
corresponding ϕω∗kk(u) are uniquely determined (by the budget line and s¯k).
Furthermore, given consumption point ϕω∗kk(u), since households’ preferences
are smooth, the slope of the indifference curve passing through ϕω∗kk is uniquely
determined. Finally, let Φω∗kk(u) ≡
DsωkkE[ukk|Fk∨σ(Ψ
ω∗
k )]
DzωkkE[ukk|Fk∨σ(Ψ
ω∗
k )]
|ϕω∗kk (u) the equilibrium
utility level (and the equilibrium housing price in city k) is given by solving
Ψω∗k (u) = Φω∗kk(u), as shown in Figure 5. Let f(u) ≡ Ψω∗k (u)− Φω∗kk(u), since
Ψω∗k and Φω∗kk are continuous in u, f(u) is continuous in u. At E¯, f(u) < 0 since
Ψω∗k (u) = 0 at E¯. Given s¯k > 0, by smooth boundary condition, Φω∗kk(u)→ 0
as zωkk → 0, which implies that ∃u such that f(u) > 0, ∀u ≤ u. Therefore,
by the intermediate value theorem, there exists a u∗∗ solving f(u) = 0 and
thus there exists a rational expectations equilibrium. The uniqueness of
equilibrium can be guaranteed by the condition that Φω∗kk(u) is increasing
with u, which is true when the consumption of housing is a normal good as
shown in Berliant and Fujita (1992).
Under insensitivity, we want to prove that the unique rational expecta-
tions equilibrium is non-fully revealing. Suppose the equilibrium is fully-
revealing, then choose arbitrary k, we can have
Ψω∗k = Ψωkk 6= Ψω
′
kk = Ψω
′∗
k , ∀ω, ω′ ∈ Ω. (45)
First, for household k (living in city k in equilibrium), any pair of ω, ω′ must
be in different partition elements. That is, Fk ∨ σ(Ψω∗k ) = F . Second, from
(42) and (44), Ψωk 6= Ψω
′
k implies, ∀ω, ω′ ∈ Ω,
Dsωkku
ω
kk
Dzωkku
ω
kk
∣∣∣
ϕω∗kk
6=
Dsω′kku
ω′
kk
Dzω′kku
ω′
kk
∣∣∣
ϕω′∗kk
. (46)
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Figure 5: The determination of equilibrium housing price and equilibrium
utility for household k in city k in state ω, k ∈ {1, ..., n}.
However, since every pair of ω, ω′ must be in different partition elements,
from insensitivity, there exist ω, ω′ ∈ Ω such that
Dsωkku
ω
kk
Dzωkku
ω
kk
∣∣∣
ϕω∗kk
=
Dsω′kku
ω′
kk
Dzω′kku
ω′
kk
∣∣∣
ϕω′∗kk
, (47)
a contradiction with (46). In fact, these non-fully revealing equilibrium prices
reveal nothing beyond σ(P (ω))ω∈Ω in equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Insensitivity is sufficient and necessary for the existence of a non-fully
revealing rational expectations equilibrium. The first part of the definition
of insensitivity ensures that any household who can distinguish ω and ω′,
his/her marginal rate of substitution reflects no difference in states. That is,
there are states that the informed household does not care about. However,
the second part of the definition implies that his/her information is useful
for someone in maximizing utility, that is, there is some information needed
which is not transmitted from informed to uninformed households. There-
fore, the rational expectations equilibrium is non-fully revealing. Without
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insensitivity, the equilibrium can only be fully-revealing.
Theorem 3 Given Assumption 1 and housing consumption is a normal
good, under no insensitivity, there exists a unique rational expectations equi-
librium that is fully revealing.
Proof. From Assumption 1 and Lemma 1, it is shown that the rational ex-
pectations equilibrium exists and corresponds to the bid rent equilibrium.
When insensitivity condition is violated, the realized marginal rates of sub-
stitution are different ∀ωk ∈ Ωk. Furthermore, for every k ∈ K, σ˜k ⊆ Fk, so
the resulting bid rents are different in all states, implying that the rational
expectations equilibrium is fully revealing. Q.E.D.
In the literature, an open and dense subset of standard economies with
fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium is found. However, under
the natural assumption of spatially local perturbations of utility functions,
as shown in the previous section, an open subset of urban economies with
only non-fully revealing equilibria is found. Therefore, neither the set of fully
revealing nor the set of non-fully revealing economies can be dense under
the structure of urban economics. Non-fully revealing equilibrium is more
interesting in highlighting the potential positive value and the strategic use
of information. When non-local perturbations are considered, though they
are not so reasonable in urban economics, the results are the same as the
ones in standard general equilibrium models. That is, there is an open and
dense subset of economies that possess a fully revealing rational expectations
equilibrium.
As shown in the comparison in Table 1, the inefficiency in information
transmission in a housing/land market rests on two key assumptions: spa-
tially local utility perturbations and the standard setting in urban economics
that every household can consume housing in only one place. When either of
them is violated, the result in standard models is restored. That is, in eco-
nomic circumstances where there is no location structure or no spatially local
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property of utility, generically, the efficiency of prices in information trans-
mission is attained in a rational expectations equilibrium. We conclude that
geographic structure, together with spatially local utility properties, can play
a role in distorting the efficiency of the market in transmitting information
from informed to uninformed households.
Households can consume Ordinary consumption set
housing in only one place
Spatially local Open subsets of economies An open and dense subset
utility with fully revealing and of economies with fully
perturbations non-fully revealing equilibria revealing equilibria
(Urban economics)
Spatially An open and dense subset An open and dense subset
non-local of economies with fully of economies with fully
utility revealing equilibria revealing equilibria
perturbations (Standard model)
Table 1: A comparison of the results in this paper with the results in the
literature.
If households can be redistributed so that location is coincident with
information, then we can create a fully-revealing rational expectations equi-
librium. However, this idea seems impractical since in most cases, unless the
households are very risk averse, households’ subjective preferences for loca-
tion do not necessarily depend on the information that they have. A classical
way to induce households to reveal their private information, as shown in De-
breu (1959) Chapter 7 and Arrow (1964), is to consider a contingent claim
or financial market. This idea is discussed in the next section.
5 Adding Financial Markets
Some may wonder: When contingent claim or financial markets are included,
do our examples with no fully-revealing rational expectations equilibrium
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survive? This interesting question is examined here.
Following the setting of Example 1, and in addition, following Magill
and Quinzii (1996), consider that the two households can buy and sell state-
contingent financial securities in financial markets before they consume com-
posite good and housing. That is, consider a one-period, two-stage model as
follows. At the beginning of the first stage, households are endowed with e0j
units of numeraire (composite consumer good), j = 1, 2. Household 2 has
complete information about the states in two cities, and household 1 has no
information. The financial markets are opened in stage 1, where the two
households can buy and sell securities. Assume that the financial markets
are complete in that the number of securities is the same as the number of
states, so we can use the same index for securities and states. Specifically, the
security ω, ω ∈ Ω, is a contract promising to deliver one unit of numeraire
(income) in state ω, and 0 in other states, in the second stage. All securities
are perfectly monitored and perfectly enforced. After closing the financial
markets and the first stage, all security returns are paid at the beginning
of the second stage. Then an absentee landlord trades with households in
spot housing markets. The game is complete when the housing markets are
closed. We want to know whether there is a fully-revealing rational expecta-
tions equilibrium under the new setting or not.
Denote eωj to be household j’s endowment in state ω in the second stage,
and νj ≡ (νωj )ω∈Ω ∈ R4 be household j’s portfolio. Let q ≡ (qω)ω∈Ω ∈ R4
and V ≡ (V ω)ω∈Ω ∈ R16 where qω ∈ R and V ω ∈ R4 represent the price
of security ω and the payoffs of securities in state ω, respectively. That is,
V ω is a row vector of zeros except that the element representing state ω is
1, and V ω 6= V ω′ , for all ω 6= ω′. The fully revealing rational expectations
equilibrium under the new setting can be solved by backward induction as
follows.
Suppose there exists a fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium.
From Section 2.2, it is shown that given Y ωj , households’ indirect utility
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functions with optimization in stage 2 are
Uω1 = αω1 ln x¯− ln(1 + αω1 ) + lnY ω1 ,
Uω2 = βω2 ln y¯ − ln(1 + βω2 ) + lnY ω2 .
Through monotonic transformations of these indirect utility functions, house-
hold j’s optimization problems in stage 1 can be written as
max
νj
U˜ωj ≡ lnY ωj
s.t. q · νj = e0j ,
Y ωj − eωj = V ω νj.
Denoting the true state as ωˆ, since households learn the true state by observ-
ing prices in a fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium, it is obvious
that the equilibrium security prices must satisfy qωˆ∗ = 1 and qω∗ = 0, ∀ω 6= ωˆ.
Since for arbitrary different ωˆ, ωˆ′, the corresponding equilibrium price vec-
tors are not the same, each q∗ reveals a unique ωˆ. Therefore, it follows that
q∗ supports a fully-revealing rational expectations equilibrium.
Though we show that adding financial markets helps to reveal the in-
formed household’s private information, there are some issues with this idea.
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) argue that the informed household can use
their private information to take advantage of uninformed households. Thus,
if the financial markets and the corresponding fully-revealing equilibrium
prices make private information publicly available to every household, the
informed household could not earn an information rent (coming from asym-
metric information) and has an incentive to hide his/her private informa-
tion (by pretending to be uninformed). Therefore, though adding financial
markets can restore the existence of a fully-revealing rational expectations
equilibrium, there are reasons why these financial markets might not exist.
Of course, if financial asset markets are incomplete for whatever reason, the
problems we have discussed return.
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6 Conclusions
Radner (1979), Jordan (1980), and Allen (1981) prove the existence of an
open and dense subset of standard economies that possess fully-revealing
rational expectations equilibria. Since in urban economies an open subset of
economies without fully-revealing rational expectations equilibrium is found,
this paper shows that Allen’s theorem about the existence of a dense subset of
economies possessing fully-revealing rational expectations equilibrium does
not extend to urban economies when spatially local perturbations of utilities
are considered. These perturbations retain the property that the utility of
living at a location depends only on the consumption bundle at that location
and the resolution of uncertainty about local variables only. Furthermore,
since an open subset of economies with fully revealing rational expectations
equilibria can easily be constructed, we cannot challenge the existence of an
open subset of economies that possess fully-revealing rational expectations
equilibria in the context of urban economies. Therefore, neither the set of
fully revealing nor the set of non-fully revealing economies can be dense under
the structure of urban economics.
This paper highlights the important “local conditions” for the existence
of rational expectations equilibria in urban economies. The existence of a
unique rational expectations equilibrium is proved with the assumption of
ordered relative steepness of bid rents. Whether the rational expectations
equilibrium is fully revealing or non-fully revealing depends on the insensi-
tivity condition: When insensitivity is satisfied, the unique rational expec-
tations equilibrium is non-fully revealing; otherwise, the equilibrium is fully
revealing. Though introducing financial markets can restore the existence of
fully-revealing rational expectations equilibrium, many provisos also accom-
pany it. In summary, geography can play a role in undermining the efficiency
of market prices in transmitting information from informed to uninformed
households.
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One potential extension of this paper is to consider a continuum of house-
holds; however, the intuition that the mismatch of locally-informed house-
holds and their corresponding equilibrium locations is likely to yield an open
subset of economies possessing only non-fully revealing rational expectations
equilibria seems robust. Other topics for future research are to extend the
intuition behind our results to other models. For example, in an overlap-
ping generations model, time may play a role similar to the spatial structure
in preventing information transmission. Moreover, when search/matching
models are considered, stable equilibrium may also pick only the best of all
potential matches. In either of these cases, we conjecture that there exists an
open subset of economies with no fully-revealing rational expectations equi-
librium, since agents with information about states in other lifetimes (in the
overlapping generations framework) or in other equilibrium matches (in the
search framework) might not have their information reflected in equilibrium
prices.
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Appendix A. Proof of Lemma 1
Comparing Definition 1 and Definition 2, since condition (iii) is the same as
equations (4), ∀ω with µ(ω) > 0, we only need to prove that conditions (i)
and (ii) are equivalent to equations (2) and (3).
First, to prove this, given that (2) and (3) are satisfied but either (i) or
(ii) is not true, we want to show contradictions. If (i) is not true, there exists
Ω0 ⊆ Ω with µ(Ω0) > 0 such that ψ∗k(ω) · ϕ∗jk(ω) > Yk − Tk, ∀ω ∈ Ω0. Then
for these ω ∈ Ω0, we can have Ψω∗k sω∗jk + zω∗jk > Yk − Tk, which implies
Ψω∗k >
Yk − Tk − zω∗jk
sω∗jk
, ∀ω ∈ Ω0,
a contradiction with (2), choosing the utility level the same as the optimalized
level by Definition 1 (u = u∗).
On the other hand, if (ii) is not true, then ∃j and ϕ′j(ω) within the budget
constraint such that
∫
Ω
uωj (ϕ′j) dµ(ω|Fj ∨ σ(Ψ∗)) >
∫
Ω
uωj (ϕ∗j) dµ(ω|Fj ∨ σ(Ψ∗)). (48)
For this household j and for city k where he/she lives, we can choose u = u∗,
and then by strict concavity and strict monotonicity, there exists  > 0 and
ϕ′′j (ω) ≡
ϕ′j(ω)+ϕ∗j (ω)
2 −  such that E[u(ϕ
′′
j |Fj)] = u∗. Since ψ∗k(ω) · ϕ′′jk(ω) <
Yk − Tk implies Ψω∗k <
Yk−Tk−zω
′′
jk
sω′′jk
, let Ψω′′k ≡
Yk−Tk−zω
′′
jk
sω′′jk
, we find Ψω′′k > Ψω∗k
for a given u = u∗. Thus, ϕω∗jk does not maximize Ψω∗jk , a contradiction with
equation (3).
Secondly, given (i) and (ii) are true, but either (2) or (3) is not satisfied,
we want to prove that there is a contradiction. If (2) does not hold, there
exists k and j such that Ψωjk > Ψω∗k but j does not live in city k. Suppose
j lives in city k′ 6= k. Then for this household j, since he/she can pay less
for the housing in k than the price that makes he/she indifferent between
the housing in k and k′, household j has an incentive to move into city k, a
contradiction with condition (ii) that ϕ∗j maximizes j’s conditional expected
utility.
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If (3) does not hold, since the budget line with Ψω∗jk is not tangent to the
indifference curve for a given u, by strict concavity, there exists ϕω′jk 6= ϕω∗jk
such that E[u(ϕ′j|Fj)] = u∗. By strict concavity, choosing ϕω
′′
jk ≡
ϕω∗jk+ϕ
ω′
jk
2 ,
then ϕω′′jk is available for household j to achieve E[u(ϕ′′j |Fj)] > u∗, a contra-
diction with (ii) that ϕ∗j maximizes household j’s expected utility.
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